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Summary:  Protection of the environment was not a specific importance to the 
Community although the Treaty of Rome expressly specified that "health, safety, 
environmental protection" shall be based on "a high level of protection". In deciding 
upon a framework for a European environmental policy, the Community was also 
responding to increased public awareness of the problem and concerns about the state of 
the natural and man-made environment. During the past years, competitiveness concerns 
have dominated the EU policy debate, in the course of which a growing consensus is 
being developed on the importance of eco-innovations and resource efficiency for EU 
competitiveness and on the market opportunities they offer. There is an increasing 
evidence that environmental policy and eco-innovations can promote economic growth, 
as well as maintain and create jobs, contributing both to competitiveness and 
employment. Environmental constraints to rapid economic growth are increasingly 
recognized by countries, leading to a rising awareness of the need for sustainable 
development. Implementation of an environmental policy, however, generates 
significant implications for competition among countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the 1950s there was no influential generalized concern for the environment 
and EC policy on the environment. The Treaty of Rome made no provision for 
any joint EU policy on controlling pollution, let alone more general 
environmental conservation.  
By the end of the 1960s, however, a new attitude which led to demands for 
new policies had become widespread, although not initially as strongly as their 
counterparts in the United States. Western Europe had begun to express concern 
over degradation of the environment.  
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There were various organized groups who had an effect on EC 
environmental policy especially where they have a stronger crusading force to 
the aspects of environmental concern which had most influence on policy. Some 
national governments have felt obliged to be seen to be responsive to public 
opinion on environmental issues, in order to try to keep the "Green Party" 
members in the European Parliament (MEPs) from gaining enough seats to be a 
threat to the government majorities. These governments, initially primarily the 
German and Dutch, have an extra incentive to support EU environmental 
policies.  
The change from 1957 is that pollution is seen to be a general, ongoing, 
problem. It is now considered that action should be introduced to control harm 
before blatantly dangerous situations occur.  
As a result of the changes, in October 1972 the heads of government called 
for an EC environmental programme, which led to approval in November 1973 
of the First Environmental Programme 1973-78. This has been followed by 
subsequent programmes.  
Despite the agreement of the heads of government to an EC programme, and 
thus to a commitment to joint policies, for some years there was doubt as to 
whether there really was a legal basis for issuing directives in this area. On 
several issues, the UK approach to pollution control differed sharply from the 
majority view among the other member states. There were some who proposed a 
challenge to the legality of the directives. 
The official basis for actions that were clearly not foreseen in the Treaty of 
Rome was twofold. First, in cases of few of the types of pollution which dealt 
with could result from the use of goods, joint EC standards could clearly be 
justified as part of product harmonization to prevent different national standards 
acting as a non-tariff barrier to inter-state trade. The second basis claimed for EC 
environmental policies would justify joint policies on all types of environmental 
concern, even where trade is unaffected.  
In 1986, Articles 130R-130T were inserted into the Treaty by the SEA 
which are explicitly devoted to the environment. Furthermore, according to 
Article 100A, actions taken to further the "completion of the internal market"  
(El-Agraa, 2001, p. 447) are supposed to take as their base a high level of 
environmental protection. In addition, allowance is made for individual member 
states to set higher environmental standards, provided that these do not 
constitute barriers to trade - though the acceptable boundaries can be 
contentious. Conflicts did arise over whether particular directives should be 
treated as relating to product harmonization and thus subject to majority voting 
or as environmental protection and requiring unanimous agreement. The 
amendment of Article 130S at Maastricht and Amsterdam further extended 
majority voting to most aspects of environmental policy, so that in general it 
does not now matter which Article is used.  EU Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
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The SEA, Maastricht and, especially, Amsterdam treaties increased the 
power of the European Parliament and this can also lead to stronger EU policies 
on the environment and the adoption of stricter standards. The European 
Parliament is generally considered to be more concerned about environmental 
issues than the Council. One case where pressure from Parliament's amendment 
in April 1989 of the Council's proposal on exhaust emissions, which resulted in 
more stringent limits that could be met only by using catalytic converters on all 
cars. Given the general movement towards environmental consciousness in the 
preceding year, the previous opponents of stringent limits (especially the United 
Kingdom) were not prepared to face the odium of no action at all as a result of 
rejecting the Parliament's amendment.
1 
With a point of the legality according to the unamended Treaty of Rome of 
EC directives on issues affecting the environment, the governments of the 
member states wanted a joint environmental policy at all, on those aspects where 
individual national policies would not be a barrier to trade and where 
transfrontier flows of pollution were not a problem.
2 This based on two primary 
motivations.  
First, statements by EC leaders, if there were to be public support for the 
European ideal, the EC should be identified in the minds of the public with 
issues with which they were concerned. Joint EC policies on an issue which had 
recently become the focus of much media discussion and campaigning would 
help to convince the public that the Community was relevant to them and 
responsive to their worries. 
Second, it was clear to governments in member states that they would have 
to respond to public pressures over pollution and environmental preservation. 
Many of the measures which would be required were likely to raise production 
costs. If some countries were to have tighter standards than others, then their 
firms would face "unfair competition" from firms that had lower production 
costs just because they were located in countries that had laxer requirements on 
pollution abatement.
3 Uniform emission standards (UES) would prevent this 
threat to competitiveness. Hence the desire of governments for joint EC 
environmental policies which would affect all member states equally. 
                                             
1  It is not always the case that Green MEPs in the European Parliament are inevitably more 
environmentalist than the Council. In debates on a tough new proposal for recycling cars in late 
1999, it seemed very likely that the EP would relax the Council and Commission decision. This 
may be due to the more conservative political composition of the EP following the 1999 elections 
and/or the vulnerability of some MEPs to sophisticated lobbying by producers (though in the end 
the attempted weakening was not carried through). 
2 As already indicated, the small group which could lead to barriers could be dealt with under the 
procedures on product harmonization. 
3 As in other applications of this notion of "unfair competition", or "distortion of competition" as it 
is often called in EU documents, it contains implicit assumptions about the fixity of wages, prices 
and exchange rates. These assumptions are often not realized and their validity may or may not be 
dubious. Boban Stojanović and Snežana Radukić 
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2. EU Environmental policy 
 
One of the principal objectives of the countries comprising the EU is "the 
constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their people" 
(TEEC, Preamble) (Hitiris, 2003, p. 323). This objective entrusts the Community 
with a clear responsibility to ensure high standards of environmental quality and 
is the chief reason for inaugurating a Community environmental policy. Besides, 
there are at least two reasons more. A second reason is that differences in 
national environmental legislation could affect the operation of the common 
market by creating distortions in competition and technical barriers to trade. 
Therefore, countries with high environmental standards (such as Denmark and 
Germany) have tended to argue for harmonization at a high level, while other 
member states urge a more flexible form of harmonization. The third reason is 
that often pollution is not constrained within the borders of a country, but is an 
international problem that requires international solutions. 
Protection of the environment was not a specific power of the Community 
although the Treaty of Rome expressly specified that "health, safety, 
environmental protection" shall be based on "a high level of protection" (TEEC). 
In deciding to frame a European environmental policy, the Community was also 
responding to increased public awareness of the problem and concern about the 
state of the natural and man-made environment. When by the early 1970s 
environmental concerns started spreading worldwide, the European Council 
declared in 1972 that environmental issues were on the policy agenda of the 
Community. The Single European Act (SEA, 1986) clarified this issue by 
declaring that "a policy in the sphere of the environment" (TEEC) is among the 
Community's tasks for establishing the common market. Consequently, under a 
new Title assigned to the environment, the treaty elevated action on the 
environment to the status of "Community policy" with the following specific 
objectives: 
  preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; 
  protecting human health; 
  prudent and rational utilization of natural resources; 
  promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems (TEEC) (Hitiris, 2003, p. 324). 
Community policy is based on many principles, but the following are major: 
  the preventive principle; 
  the polluter pays principle; 
  the source principle (i.e. environmental damage should be rectified at 
source); EU Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
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  the precautionary principle (i.e. that policy will be undertaken even if 
the evidence on cause and effect is not scientifically established, subject to 
the "potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action"); 
  the integration principle. The Treaty on European Union clarified that 
the goal of the Community is "sustainable growth respecting the 
environment". Accordingly, subject to the subsidiarity principle, the 
Community's task is to coordinate the policy of the member states in the 
interest of avoiding competition distortions in the single market (Hitiris, 
2003, p. 324).  
Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam enshrined sustainable development 
as one of the Union's integration principles, requiring all proposals by the 
Commission to be based on an appraisal of their environmental impact. 
Accordingly, after a Community harmonization measure has been adopted, 
member states must protect the environment by either existing or new national 
provisions.  
The Treaty has also established a more efficient decision-making procedure 
for environment policy, replacing unanimity in the Council by qualified majority 
voting as the general rule and the Community monitors the implementation of 
the common environmental law. The Commission may issue infringement 
warnings to offending parties and, as a last resort, refer cases to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Hence, the first United Nations Conference on the Environment in 1972 took 
place and was soon followed in the same year by an agreement among the EC-6 
to lay down the common principles for future Community action on the 
environment. This was followed by the First Environment Action Programme 
(EAP, 1973-7) which, along with similar programmes that succeeded it, set up 
the framework for Community environment policy and led to the adoption of a 
series of directives on the protection of natural resources (air, water), noise 
abatement, conservation and waste management. These programmes confirmed 
that the Community objective of economic growth was linked with protection of 
the environment and conservation of natural resources, not only within the EU 
but internationally by Community involvement in multilateral environmental 
conventions aimed at global and regional collaboration.  
The Community in 1987 established in Copenhagen the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA) to monitor the environmental performance of EU 
member states and to act in the field of environmental legislation, providing the 
Commission and national authorities with technical, scientific and economic 
information necessary for adopting measures to protect the environment.  
The Fifth EAP (1993-7) concentrated on "sustainable development" and 
dealt with the form that growth must take to safeguard the environment. The 
programme also provided for specific financial aid mechanisms, such as the 
Cohesion Fund and the financial instrument for the environment, LIFE, which Boban Stojanović and Snežana Radukić 
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were designed to support priority measures for implementation of Community 
environmental policy and technical assistance to non-member countries. 
Actual the Sixth EAP (2001-10) identified four priority action areas: 
  climate change 
  nature and biodiversity 
  environment and health 
  natural resources and waste (Hitiris, 2003, p. 326). 
Since previous experience has proved that the problem the EU is facing is 
not lack of environmental policies but the implementation of these policies, the 
new EAP focuses on the active involvement and accountability of all sections of 
society, including the polluters and the polluted.  
The EU member states had adopted their own national measures to protect 
the environment even before the action programmes. However, different 
preferences, assimilative capacity, levels of pollution, patterns of ownership and 
utilization of natural resources meant that the degree of environmental protection 
differed significantly between countries. Even under the Common environmental 
policy the member states will differ in the action they take and in the outcome 
they achieve. The diverging levels of pollution and attitudes to anti-pollution 
policy have meant that the Community environmental policy is the result of a 
compromise based on the lowest common denominator. Member states that 
expect higher levels of environmental protection, and can afford it, are free to 
apply it.  
In recent years Community environmental policy (more about EU 
Environmental policy see in: Vasić, 2004)  has grown significantly so that the 
EU is currently playing an important role in the global fight for pollution 
control. The Community policy deals with all sources of environmental 
deterioration, such as waste management; noise; air and water pollution; 
discharges; nature and biodiversity; industrial risks; and civic protection from 
technological hazards.  
The Community law and policies concerning the environment are included 
among the criteria for membership, which the applicant countries of central and 
eastern Europe have to meet in order to avoid an "environmental gap" between 
them and the EU member states. The applicant countries have to transpose all 
existing Community environmental law into their national legislation and to 
integrate the environmental dimension into all their policies.  
Generally, since environmental issues became very important, EU must 
answer by efficient measures of common environmental policy. Because 
competitiveness is major reason for the common environmental policy, in the 
following will be examine some aspects of the common environmental and 
competition policy. 
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3. Relationship between Environmental policy and competitiveness 
 
3.1. Modernisation of EU Competition policy 
Competition policy is part of public policy, ostensibly it identifies the EU’s 
commitment to fair competition to protect consumers against a distorted market 
price due to, for example the disproportionate power of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). A competitive environment is of EU-wide benefit as it contributes to 
economic growth through increased efficiency, hence increased productivity. A 
public policy on competition is, however, not simply a question of applying 
economics, as Massel states “the formulation of public policies bearing on 
competition is strongly influenced by public goals and current government 
activities” (Smith-Hillman and Vindelyn, 2006, p. 34). 
It is necessary to consider the governance process initiated by the European 
Commission in the modernisation of European Community (EC) competition 
policy. Council Regulation in 2003 re-defines the powers of national 
competition authorities (NCAs) and the Commission. In particular EC policy re-
shaping focused on the Treaty of Rome (1957) that prohibits the use of anti-
competitive agreements and the abuse of a dominant position, respectively. 
These two forms of anti-competitive behaviour are central to the pursuit of a fair 
competitive environment. The monetary equivalent of the UK welfare loss due 
to unfair competition (anti-competitive behaviour) is estimated to lie between 
£4.5 and 9.0 billion (Smith-Hillman and Vindelyn, 2006, p. 34). 
The competitive spectrum can be classified into two broad groups, perfect 
competition (idealised benchmark) and imperfect competition. Competitive 
markets are actively encouraged because they facilitate economic growth 
through improved efficiency, and increase the prospect for higher average 
standards of living. The goal of public policy is not the attainment of perfect 
competition but a competitive norm, "but it is difficult to state a priori how much 
competition is needed to achieve desirable economic performance, nor can we 
formulate hard and fast rules for identifying cases in which a departure from 
competition is desirable" (Smith-Hillman and Vindelyn, 2006, p. 35). 
Imperfect markets occur following the absence of one or more of the 
underpinning assumptions. Producers stand to benefit through increased 
producer surplus at the expense of lower consumer surplus. Market failure 
results as the price mechanism, the co-ordination mechanism, fails to accurately 
reflect demand and supply conditions. This is due to chiefly five factors: 
monopoly power, a few sellers are able to wield significant price influence 
unrelated to cost conditions; asymmetric (incomplete) information regarding, for 
example, price, quality, the range of availability; unassigned property rights; 
externalities
4 and the provision of public goods.
5 
                                             
4 For this paper are important ecological external effects. Boban Stojanović and Snežana Radukić 
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Regulation is the arbitrator attempting to deliver a competitive outcome 
under conditions that deviate from the competitive ideal. Regulation via 
competition policy imposes a penalty on firms that abuse their dominant 
position, i.e. on firms which make ecological externality to others and penalty 
need to be difference between social and private costs of their production.  
Competition policy is part of wider EC public policy undertaken in the 
interest of its citizens to maximise welfare. With this mandate in place it aims to 
achieve economic efficiency by encouraging conditions, which foster the growth 
of competitive markets.   
Hence, public policy was envisaged as the vehicle though which to further 
the primary integration objective. EC competition policy is distinct from other 
non-EU competition policies given the additional explicit political intention of 
fostering (EU) integration in addition to the pursuit of fair competition.  
Table 1 compares the objectives of competition policies in Japan and the US 
in relation to the EU. All three countries/regions indicate the promotion of 
competition as a primary objective, and with the exception of the EU, the sole 
objective. The inclusion of European cohesion as a further, social and political, 
objective has direct bearing on policy administration and enforcement. The 
Commission has generally viewed co-operation agreements that fostered 
integration between member states favourably, even if they verged on the anti-
competitive and threatened the viability of small undertakings. 
 
Table 1. Objective and originating year of competition policy 
Country/region   Year  Objective 
European Union  1962 
Promotion of EU 
integration
6; promotion of 
competition within EU 
United States  1890 
Promotion of competition 
for the protection of 
consumer welfare 
Japan 1947 
Promotion of competition 
for the protection of 
economic welfare 
Source: Smith-Hillman and Vindelyn, 2006, p. 36 
 
1.1.1.  Pre-modernisation EC Competition policy 
The development of policy within the EU was contextually different from that of 
its member nation-states and other non-European nation-states of comparative 
economic power such as the US and Japan. The EU gains its legitimacy through 
                                                                                                               
5 In the literature can find different classification of so-called market failure or lack of market 
mechanism, but quoted is by: Griffiths, A. and Wall, S., Applied Economics, Pearson Education 
Ltd, Harlow, 2001, pp. 181 
6 Unique to the EU. EU Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
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the European Parliament, which represents the voice of the people, members are 
directly elected by EU citizens; the Council, its legislative arm representing the 
voice of the member states; the Commission, the executive arm overseeing the 
administration and enforcement of EU policy. 
Cognizant of divergent legal, socio-economic and political stances of its 
members ensured fairly tight control centrally from Brussels, by the directorate-
general for competition (DGCOMP). Four groups of directorates were 
established to oversee the administration and enforcement of competition law. 
Directorate A covered policy; Directorate B the merger task force; Directorate 
C-F dealt with antitrust and Directorate G-H dealt with state aid (more about 
institutions, goals, and tasks of EU competition policy see in: Stojanović, 2003a 
and 2003b). The directorates were, therefore, inclined to develop discipline-
focussed expertise as against sectoral expertise. The emphasise appears to have 
been on developing appropriate legal procedures in keeping with the 
enforcement of competition legislation as it related to mergers, state aid and 
antitrust. In this context, therefore, an understanding of sectoral nuances became 
a residual by-product of the process.  
 
1.1.2.  Post-modernisation EC Competition policy 
The adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on 1 May 2004, heralds 
the beginning of a new era with respect to the enforcement, administration and 
application of EC competition legislation. Widely held acceptance of the 
importance of competition policy, as evidenced through the existence of 
competition policies within member-states, was not a feature of the community. 
The micro-level supervisory role had to be rethought to reflect significant 
growth in numbers coupled with impending enlargement. Stretched community 
resources dictated the need for new, more efficient systems that did not 
compromise the central integration tenet. 
Modernisation delivers decentralisation that gives member states greater 
involvement in policy decision-making. Member states will no longer be 
required to forward applications for exemption to Brussels. As a consequence 
designated NCAs (National Competition Authority) and/or courts will now 
handle more cases. The Commission will only deal with those cases that have 
wider EU trade implications and/or raise novel issues. The administration of EC 
competition law is anticipated to become much more fluid and less fraught as 
bureaucracy is redirected at more significant cartel cases that involve multiple 
jurisdictions. However, recognizing the need for consistency, entrenched in the 
new legislation is the establishment of European competition networks (ECNs). 
This provides the vehicle for the dissemination of information and consultation 
amongst all parties involved in the application of EC legislation. However, the 
supremacy of EC competition legislation, however, indicated the parallel 
treatment of national competition law and EC law. Boban Stojanović and Snežana Radukić 
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Council extends the enforcement powers of the Commission to the ability to 
impose structural remedies. Additionally, the EC has extended its powers to 
access information to include the right to search private dwellings, but only with 
judicial approval. They will also have powers to seal premises in order to 
safeguard the evidence and prevent tampering.  
Administrative changes have brought structural reorganisation within 
DGCOMP, specifically through the appointment of a chief economist to liase 
directly with the director-general. Additionally, the discipline-focussed approach 
to competition policy is to be replaced by a sector-specific focus. Prior to 
modernisation deputy director generals were charged with having “special 
responsibility” for mergers, antitrust and state aid. The growth in member-states 
dictates a change in focus to the development of sector specific expertise which 
then informs decisions regarding mergers, antitrust and state aid. 
Principle of competitiveness is also in basis of the environmental policy. 
Though environmental problems are very important and require fast and 
efficient measures of environmental policy, competitiveness can be obstacle for 
determine and enforcement of some measures of  pollution policy.  
 
3.2. Competitiveness and pollution policy 
One of the major part of the environmental policy is pollution control. Control of 
pollution is realizes by regulations or taxes. The idea of controlling pollution by 
taxation rather than by quantitative regulations imposed on firms also seems to 
fit economists' predilection for relying on price rather than quantitative controls.  
In the early 1990s it became popular to argue that there is "double dividend" 
advantage of taxes to control pollution. The first "dividend" is the benefit from 
the reduction in the benefit from the reduction in pollution that is induced by the 
tax. The second "dividend" is that the revenue from the pollution taxes can be 
used to reduce other taxes in the economy that are themselves distortionary from 
a welfare economics viewpoint, e.g. income taxes (distorting labour demand 
choices) (El-Agraa, 2001, p. 453). 
Despite cost-minimization argument, until recently pollution taxes have 
hardly been used in most EU countries, and although their use has been 
increasing, they are still relatively rare (Sweden and Denmark are the EU 
countries with most use). Among the minor exceptions is the reduced tax in 
some countries on lead-free petrol as compared with leaded petrol, during the 
period when both were available. However, in the year preceding the final 
Council agreement of 1989, the Commission - at the urging of the French and 
UK governments - had been threatening to take the Dutch to the ECJ for offering 
tax concessions to purchasers of cars fitted with catalytic converters which 
reduce exhaust pollution. This was said to be a distortion of trade - the British 
and French car makers not having moved as fast as the Germans and some 
others in adapting their production towards cars which can be easily fitted with 
converters.  EU Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
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However, the EU itself has tried taking pollution taxes more seriously. The 
Council of Environmental Ministers in 1989 requested the Commission to draft 
proposals on environmental taxation. Specific proposals by the Commission 
emerged with the debate on global warming, and the need to reduce emissions of 
carbon dioxide.  
In 1991 the Commission proposed an energy tax in two parts: one part 
related to the carbon content of fossil fuels and the other part on all non-
renewable energy. The proposal also allowed for possible exemptions for some 
industries which are particularly energy intensive, such as steel, in order to 
preserve international competitiveness - such exemptions could be removed if 
other competitor countries agreed to tax such industries in a similar way (El-
Agraa, 2001, p. 456). 
The proposals aroused considerable opposition, especially from fuel 
producers and many industrial groups. The result was that the Commission 
effectively agreed to make implementation contingent on the acceptance of 
carbon taxes in the major competitors, especially Japan and the United States. At 
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, US opposition ensured that no 
binding international agreement was reached on controlling carbon dioxide 
emissions because the US government still claimed that lack of evidence on 
carbon dioxide emissions and global warming meant that the costs of controlling 
the emission were unjustified. As a result, the Commission did not push its 
energy tax proposal with much urgency, and the Council could not come to an 
agreement on the tax. In the UK has been a major controversy with industry 
lobbying hard against government proposals to introduce a tax on the industrial 
use of energy to induce abatement of carbon dioxide emissions. Currently, EU 
directives merely encourage member states to use environmental taxes.  
One is the justification for the non-carbon part of the energy tax. The 
Commission mentioned encouragement of energy efficiency. This is only 
justifiable if there are other externalities which are due to the use of energy, 
which are not fuel specific and which cannot be taxed directly; but the case has 
not been made. It is probable that the aim was really to avoid substitution by 
nuclear power, because of its own risks but that it was considered politically 
more acceptable to achieve this as part of a new tax ostensibly aimed at global 
warming.  
Another issue raised by the EU energy tax proposals is that of international 
competitiveness and distortion of trade, as exemplified both by the initial 
exemptions on energy-intensive industries and by the reluctance to impose 
carbon-content taxes unless competitor nations do the same. From an economic 
efficiency perspective, it is precisely the most energy-intensive industries that 
should either be induced to substitute other inputs for energy usage or else raise 
their prices and cut back production the most, as they are the heavy users of a 
resource with what is now considered to be a high social cost. Hence, if we 
concentrate on the cost-minimization argument only, and ignore overall Boban Stojanović and Snežana Radukić 
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optimality, imposing the pollution tax but giving lump-sum subsidies to these 
industries (to avoid a large rise in their average costs) might be acceptable. 
Since the benefits of any reduction in carbon dioxide emissions in the EU 
would accrue globally, it is reasonable to argue that the EU should not abate at 
all unless other countries do the same. It is a classic free-rider problem, since the 
pollution is a public bad at the global level. However, if other countries were to 
agree to cut back their emissions, but decide to do so by means other than 
economic incentives, this should not affect the EU's decision on using taxes. For 
any cutback that the EU wishes to achieve, it will be better off if it achieves that 
cutback at the minimum cost. As always in arguments over international trade, 
there is a conflict between the employment impacts of changes that alter the 
pattern of production, and the efficient allocation once employment has adjusted 
to the new pattern.  
Importance of the issue of competitiveness needs joint EU policy at all. 
Major reason was because otherwise some member states might suffer a loss of 
competitiveness vis-à-vis other member states with laxer controls on pollution. 
This was, and is, considered to be unfair, or distorted, competition.  
Although the avoidance of "unfair" competition and subsequent loss of sales 
and employment has always been a fundamental principle of the EU (Treaty of 
Rome), standard economic analysis generally implies that this principle may be 
unnecessary. In the case of imposing uniformity of environmental standards, it 
may even reduce social welfare in the long run.  
Different countries may well want different levels of environmental purity 
and exposure to pollutants. These choices could result from differences in 
culture, preferences or income levels.  
Living standards fully defined will comprise both goods and services bought 
by individuals and also those provided publicly but not paid for by individual 
consumers. The latter include environmental quality. At any given level of 
national productivity and resources, if more publicly provided goods are 
consumed then less privately purchased ones can be consumed, and vice versa. 
Conventional measures of net real wages and real personal incomes only account 
for privately purchased consumption possibilities. Thus if a country wishes to 
have a higher standard of environmental quality, the level of real wages will 
have to be below that possible with lower environmental standards. 
If one country raises its environmental standards, one path that could lead to 
the fall in real wages is that, at existing initial levels of real wages, but with 
higher costs of meeting the more stringent pollution controls, firms will try to 
raise prices and thus become uncompetitive. Firms may also have to accept 
lower profits. Whether or not this happens depends on how internationally 
mobile capital is. In the EU, it may well be that profit rates cannot be forced 
down. As unemployment begins to rise, wage reductions will be needed to 
restore full employment. Wage cuts will enable firms to cut prices and to 
compete again. The final equilibrium will be one of full employment and EU Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
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capacity output. Although there will be lower incomes than initially when 
defined in terms of privately purchased goods, there should be higher living 
standards when these are viewed as including enjoyment of environmental 
amenities and reduced pollution.  
In the process that has been indicated here, the interim period of "unfair 
competition" is part of the market mechanism leading to the correct result. The 
problem is that if wages in EU countries are rigid downwards even in the face of 
protracted high unemployment, the unemployment may last a long time, together 
with it attendant social and economic troubles. Hence the pressure for common 
EU emission standards. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
With a point of the legality according to the unamended Treaty of Rome of EC 
directives on issues affecting the environment, the governments of the member 
states wanted a joint environmental policy at all, on those aspects where 
individual national policies would not be a barrier to trade and where 
transfrontier flows of pollution were not a problem. 
The EU has recognized that integration and development cannot be based on 
the depletion of natural resources and the deterioration of the environment. 
Therefore, the Community is attempting to develop a sustainable energy policy, 
taking full account of the environmental impact of energy production, 
transmission and consumption. In the field of environmental policy the 
Community has developed a strategy based on the basic principles of sustainable 
development:  
  integration of environmental policy in other Community policies, 
  the polluter pays, 
  taking precautionary measures before there is a problem, 
  benefit/cost analysis of action or lack of action, 
  harmonization, monitoring of compliance, and the punishment of 
offenders. 
Although the Community has achieved quite a lot in the environment, much 
remains that requires action by both individual member states and the 
Community at large. The EU member states had adopted their own national 
measures to protect the environment even before the action programmes. 
However, different preferences, assimilative capacity, levels of pollution, 
patterns of ownership and utilization of natural resources meant that the degree 
of environmental protection differed significantly between countries. Even under 
the Common environmental policy the member states will differ in the action 
they take and in the outcome they achieve. The diverging levels of pollution and 
attitudes to anti-pollution policy have meant that the Community environmental 
policy is the result of a compromise based on the lowest common denominator. Boban Stojanović and Snežana Radukić 
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Member states that expect higher levels of environmental protection, and can 
afford it, are free to apply it.  
The Community law and policies concerning the environment are included 
among the criteria for membership which the applicant countries of central and 
eastern Europe have to meet in order to avoid an "environmental gap" between 
them and the EU member states. The applicant countries have to transpose all 
existing Community environmental law into their national legislation and to 
integrate the environmental dimension into all their policies.  
Despite the fact that it may not be clear that common policies are required at 
all in many cases, nevertheless a set of policies has emerged. Furthermore, 
despite some of the problems and despite the failure to move quickly on some 
other policies because of the conflicting interests of the member states, progress 
has been fairly steady. As indicated, the problems arise because the short run 
during which wages would be too high, and thus unemployment also be too 
high, might last a long time. The long-run result of differing national 
environmental standards would eventually be higher social welfare, but it may 
take too long to be waited for passively.  
In the 1990s there has been a revival of public interest in the environment. 
Those in favour of stronger environmental policies may well feel divided about 
EU actions. Those who live in those member states where Green pressures are 
strong will feel that they are held back, as compared with what their 
governments could achieve without the requirement to carry other member 
countries with them.  
In the second half of 1992, during the British presidency, it seemed as 
though EC environmental policy might be put into reverse. Following the 
problems in summer 1992 with ratification of the Maastricht Agreements, 
especially the UK stressed the notion of subsidiarity that had been incorporated 
into the proposed Treaty amendments. To various extents, the other member 
states, and even the chastened Commission, also said that subsidiarity should be 
taken seriously, and that EC policies should be scrutinized to see whether joint 
action was really necessary. The justification of EU level environmental policies 
is often debatable. It was possible, therefore, that the movement on subsidiarity 
might lead to the reconsideration of some existing EU environmental directives. 
However, subsidiarity has not made a major difference as far as existing 
policies are concerned. It is difficult to judge whether new EU level joint actions 
on the environment have been as readily adopted as previously, even where there 
is no strong reason for an EU, rather than a national, policy. However, 
misguided it may be from an economist's viewpoint, the standard interpretation 
of distorted competition has always been a prime reason for EU level 
environmental policy.  
Importance of the issue of competitiveness needs joint EU policy at all. 
Major reason was because otherwise some member states might suffer a loss of EU Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
  485
competitiveness vis-à-vis other member states with laxer controls on pollution. 
This was, and is, considered to be unfair, or distorted, competition.  
Although the avoidance of "unfair" competition and subsequent loss of sales 
and employment has always been a fundamental principle of the EU (Treaty of 
Rome), standard economic analysis generally implies that this principle may be 
unnecessary. In the case of imposing uniformity of environmental standards, it 
may even reduce social welfare in the long run.  
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Ekološka politika Evropske unije i konkurentnost 
 
Rezime:  Zaštita životne sredine nije bila od posebnog značaja za Zajednicu iako je 
Rimskim ugovorom određeno da "zdravlje, bezbednost i zaštita životne sredine" treba da 
budu bazirani na "visokom nivou zaštite". Prilikom odlučivanja o okviru Evropske 
ekološke politike, Zajednica je takođe reagovala na povećanje javne svesti u vezi stanja 
prirodnih i drugih resursa životne sredine. Tokom proteklih godina u okviru politike EU 
dominantan je interes za konkurentnost, tako da raste konsenzus o značaju koji ekološke 
inovacije i efikasnost resursa imaju za konkurentnost EU i otvaranje mogućnosti na 
tržištu. Sve je veći broj zaključaka da ekološka politika i eko-inovacije mogu da 
unaprede privredni rast i održavanje i povećanje zaposlenosti, doprinoseći istovremeno i 
konkurentnosti i zaposlenosti. Zemlje su sve više svesne ekoloških ograničenja brzog 
privrednog rasta što vodi rastu svesti o potrebi održivog razvoja. Međutim, primena 
ekološke politike ima značajne implikacije na konkurenciju između zemalja. 
 
Ključne reči: Ekološka politika EU, Konkurentnost, Kontrola zagađenja, Održiv razvoj, 
Efikasnost resursa 
  
JEL: Q56, Q58 
 
 